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We estimate Taylor (1993) rules and identify monetary policy shocks using no-arbitrage pricing techniques.
Long-term interest rates are risk-adjusted expected values of future short rates and thus provide strong
over-identifying restrictions about the policy rule used by the Federal Reserve. The no-arbitrage framework
also accommodates backward-looking and forward-looking Taylor rules. We find that inflation and
output gap account for over half of the variation of time-varying excess bond returns and most of the
movements in the term spread. Taylor rules estimated with no-arbitrage restrictions differ from Taylor
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Most central banks, including the U.S. Federal Reserve (Fed), conduct monetary policy to only
inﬂuence the short end of the yield curve. However, the entire yield curve responds to the
actions of the Fed because long-term interest rates are conditional expected values of future
short rates, after adjusting for risk premia. These risk-adjusted expectations of long yields are
formed based on a view of how the Fed conducts monetary policy. Thus, the whole yield curve
reﬂects the monetary actions of the Fed, so the entire term structure of interest rates can be
used to estimate monetary policy rules and extract estimates of monetary policy shocks.
According to the Taylor (1993) rule, the Fed sets the short-term interest rate by reacting to
CPI inﬂation and the output gap. To exploit the cross-equation restrictionson yield movements
implied by theassumption of no arbitrage,we place theTaylor ruleinto a term structuremodel.
The no-arbitrage assumption is reasonable in a world of large investment banks and active
hedge funds, who take positions eliminating arbitrage opportunities arising in bond prices that
are inconsistent with each other in either the cross-section or their expected movements over
time. Moreover, the absence of arbitrage is a necessary condition for an equilibrium in most
macroeconomic models. Imposing no arbitrage, therefore, can be viewed as a useful ﬁrst step
towards a fully speciﬁed general equilibrium model.
We describe expectations of future short rates by versions of the Taylor rule and a Vector
Autoregression (VAR) for macroeconomic variables. Following the approach taken in many
papers in macro (see, for example, Fuhrer and Moore, 1995), we could infer the values of long
yields from these expectations by imposing the Expectations Hypothesis (EH). However, there
is strong empirical evidence against the EH (see, for example, Campbell and Shiller, 1991;
Cochrane and Piazzesi, 2005, among many others). Term structure models can account for
deviations from the EH by explicitly incorporatingtime-varyingrisk premia (see, for example,
Dai and Singleton, 2002) .
We present a setup that embeds Taylor rules in an afﬁne term structure model with time-
varying risk premia. The structure accommodates standard Taylor rules, backward-looking
Taylor rules that allow multiple lags of inﬂation and output gap to inﬂuence the actions of the
Fed (for example, Eichenbaum and Evans, 1995; Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans, 1996),
and forward-looking Taylor rules where the Fed responds to anticipated inﬂation and output
gap (Clarida, Gal´ ı and Gertler, 2000). The framework also accommodates monetary policy
shocks that are serially correlated but uncorrelated with macro factors. The model speciﬁes
standard VAR dynamics for the macro indicators, inﬂation and output gap, together with an
1additional latent factor that drives interest rates. This latent factor captures other movements in
yields that may be correlated with inﬂation and output gap, including monetary policy shocks.
Our framework also allows risk premia to depend on the state of the macroeconomy.
By combining no-arbitrage pricing with the Fed’s policy rule, we extract information from
the entire term structure about monetary policy, and vice versa, use our knowledge about
monetary policy to model theterm structureof interest rates. The model allows us to efﬁciently
measure how different yields respond to systematic changes in monetary policy, and how they
respond to unsystematic policy shocks. Interestingly, the model implies that a large amount of
interest rate volatility is explained by systematic changes in policy that can be traced back to
movements in macro variables. For example, 74% of the variance of the 1-quarter yield and
66% of the variance of the 5-year yield can be attributed to movements in inﬂation and the
output gap. Over 78% of the variance of the 5-year term spread is due to time-varying output
gap and output gap risk. The estimated model also captures the counter-cyclical properties of
time-varying expected excess returns on bonds.
We estimate Taylor rules following the large macro literature that uses low frequencies (we
use quarterly data) at which the output gap and inﬂation are reported. Under the cross-equation
restrictions for yields implied by the no-arbitrage model, we estimate a ﬂexible speciﬁcation
for the macro and latent factors. This setup offers a natural solution to the usual identiﬁcation
problem in VAR dynamics that contain ﬁnancial data, such as bond yields (for example, Evans
and Marshall 1998, 2001; Piazzesi 2005). The Fed’sendogenous policy reactionsaredescribed
by the Taylor rule as movements in the short rate which can be traced to movements in the
macro variables that enter the rule: inﬂation and output. While the Fed may take current yield
dataintoaccount, it doesso onlybecause currentyieldscontaininformationabout futurevalues
of these macro variables.
Our paper is related to a growing literature on linking the dynamics of the term structure
with macro factors. However, the other papers in this literatureare less interested in estimating
various Taylor rules, rather than embedding a particular form of a Taylor rule, sometimes
pre-estimated, in a macroeconomic model. For example, Bekaert, Cho, and Moreno (2003),
Gallmeyer, Holliﬁeld, and Zin (2005), Rudebusch and Wu (2005), and H¨ ordahl, Tristani,
and Vestin (2006) estimate structural models with interest rates and macro variables. In
contrast to these studies, we do not impose any structural restrictions other than the absence
of arbitrage. This makes our approach more closely related to the identiﬁed VAR literature in
macroeconomics(for a survey, see Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans, 1999) and this provides
us additional ﬂexibility in matching the dynamics of the term structure. Other non-structural
2term structure models with macro factors, like Ang and Piazzesi (2003), and Dewachter and
Lyrio (2006), among many others, also do not investigate how no-arbitrage restrictions can
help estimate different policy rules.
We do not claim that no-arbitrage techniques are superior to estimating monetary policy
rulesusing structural models. Rather, webelievethat estimating policy rulesusing no-arbitrage
restrictions are a useful addition to existing methods. Our framework enables the entire
cross-section and time-series of yields to be modeled and provides a unifying framework to
jointly estimate standard, backward-, and forward-looking Taylor rules in a single, consistent
framework. Indeed, we show that many formulations of policy rules imply term structure
dynamics that are observationally equivalent. Naturally, our methodology can be used in more
structural approaches that effectively constrain the factor dynamics and risk premia.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the model and develops
the methodology showing how Taylor rules can be identiﬁed with no-arbitrageconditions. We
brieﬂy discuss the estimation strategy in Section 3. In Section 4, we lay out the empirical
results. After describing the parameter estimates, we attribute the time-variation of yields and
expected excess holdingperiodreturnsoflong-termbondstoeconomicsources. Wedescribein
detail the implied Taylor rule estimates from the model and contrast them with OLS estimates.
Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
We describe the setup of the model in Section 2.1. Section 2.2 derives closed-form solutions
for bond prices (yields) and expected returns. In Sections 2.3 to 2.8, we explain how various
Taylor rules can be identiﬁed in the no-arbitrage model.
2.1 GeneralSet-up
Our state variables are the output gap at quarter t, gt; the continuously compounded year-on-
year inﬂation rate from quarter t − 4 to t, πt; and a latent term structure state variable, fu
t .W e
measure year-on-yearinﬂation using the GDP deﬂator. Our system uses four lags of the output
gap and year-on-yearinﬂation variables but parsimoniously captures the dynamics of the latent
factor with only one lag. This speciﬁcation is ﬂexible enough to match the autocorrelogram of
year-on-year inﬂation and the output gap at a quarterly frequency. We assume that in the full
3state vector, Xt−1, potentially up to four lags of the output gap and inﬂation Granger-cause gt
and πt, but onlytheﬁrst lagof thevariables,gt−1, πt−1, fu
t−1,Granger-causethelatentfactorfu
t .
Below we show that this assumption is not restrictive (for example, in the sense of matching
impulse responses.) Thus, we can write the dynamics of the state variables as:
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and write the VAR in equation (1) in companion form as:












and μ and Φ collect the appropriateconditional means and autocorrelationmatrices of the VAR
in equation (1), respectively.
We use only one latent state variable because this is the most parsimonious set-up with
Taylor rule residuals (as the next section makes clear). This latent factor, fu
t , is a standard
latent factor in the tradition of the term-structure literature. Our focus is to show how this
factor is related to monetary policy and how the no-arbitrage restrictions can identify various
policy rules.
We specify the short rate equation to be:
rt = δ0 + δ
 
1 Xt, (3)
4for δ0 a scalar and δ1 a K ×1 vector. To keep the model tractable, our baseline system has only
contemporaneous values of gt, πt and fu
t and no lags of these factors determining rt, so only
the ﬁrst three elements of δ1 are non-zero.
To complete the model, we specify the pricing kernel to take the standard form:












with the prices of risk:
λt = λ0 + λ1Xt, (5)
for the K ×1 vector λ0 and the K ×K matrix λ1. To keep the number of parametersdown, we







where ¯ λ0 is a 3×1 vector. Likewise, we specify that the time-varyingcomponents of the prices
ofriskλ1,dependson currentand past valuesofmacro variables,butonlythecontemporaneous
valueofthelatentfactor: [gt πt fu
t gt−1 πt−1 gt−2 πt−2 gt−3 πt−3]




















t is the price of a zero-coupon bond of maturity n quarters at time t. Equivalently,

















t denotes the expectation under the risk-neutral probability measure, under which
the dynamics of the state vector Xt are characterized by the risk-neutral constant and
autocorrelation matrix:
μ
Q = μ − Σλ0
Φ
Q =Φ − Σλ1.
If investors are risk-neutral, λ0 =0and λ1 =0 , and no risk adjustment is necessary.
52.2 Bond Prices and Expected Returns
The model (2)-(5) belongs to the Dufﬁe and Kan (1996) afﬁne class of term structure models,









t is the yield on an n-period zero coupon bond at time t that is implied by the model,
which satisﬁes P
(n)
t =e x p ( −ny
(n)
t ).
The scalar an and the K × 1 vector bn are given by an = −An/n and bn = −Bn/n,w h e r e
An and Bn satisfy the recursive relations:
An+1 = An + B
 











n (Φ − Σλ1) − δ
 
1 , (8)
where A1 = −δ0 and B1 = −δ1. The recursions (8) are derived by Ang and Piazzesi (2003).
In terms of notation, the one-period yield y
(1)
t is the same as the short rate rt in equation (3).
Since yields take an afﬁne form and the conditional mean of the state vector is afﬁne,
expected holding period returns on bonds are also afﬁne in Xt.W e d e ﬁne the one-period
excess holding period return as:
rx
(n)












t − (n − 1)y
(n−1)
t+1 − rt. (9)



















which again takes an afﬁne form for the scalar Ax
n = −1
2B 
n−1ΣΣ Bn−1 + B 
n−1Σλ0 and
the K × 1 vector Bx
n = λ1Σ Bn−1. From equation (10), we can see directly that the expected
excess returncomprisesthreeterms: (i)a Jensen’s inequalityterm,(ii)a constant riskpremium,
and (iii) a time-varying risk premium. The time variation is governed by the parameters in
the matrix λ1. Since both bond yields and the expected holding period returns of bonds are
afﬁne functions of Xt, we can easily compute variance decompositions following standard
VAR methods.
62.3 The Benchmark Taylor Rule
The Taylor (1993) rule describes the Fed as adjusting short-term interest rates in response to
movements in inﬂation and real activity. The rule is consistent with a monetary authority that
minimizes a quadratic loss function that tries to stabilize inﬂation and output around a long-
run inﬂation target and the natural output rate (see, for example, Svensson 1997). Following
Taylor’s original speciﬁcation, we deﬁne the benchmark Taylor rule to be:
rt = γ0 + γ1,ggt + γ1,ππt + ε
MP,T
t , (11)
where the short rate is set by the Federal Reserve in response to current output and inﬂation.
The basic Taylor rule (11) can be interpreted as the short rate equation (3) in a standard afﬁne
term structure model, where the unobserved monetary policy shock ε
MP,T
t corresponds to a
latent term structure factor, ε
MP,T
t = γ1,ufu
t . This corresponds to the short rate equation (3) in




































which has zeros for all coefﬁcients on lagged g and π.




t , is contemporaneously uncorrelated with the output gap and inﬂation. This
assumption is satisﬁed if the output gap and inﬂation only react slowly to policy shocks.
However, there are several advantages to estimating the policy coefﬁcients, γ1,g and γ1,π,a n d
extracting the monetary policy shock, ε
MP,T
t , using no-arbitragerestrictions rather than simply
running OLS on equation (11). First, no-arbitragerestrictionscan freeup the contemporaneous
correlation between the macro and latent factors. Second, even if the macro and latent
factors are conditionally uncorrelated, OLS is consistent but not efﬁcient. By imposing
no arbitrage, we use cross-equation restrictions that produce more efﬁcient estimates by
exploiting information contained in the whole term structure in the estimation of the Taylor
rule coefﬁcients, while OLS only uses data on the short rate. Third, the term structure model
provides estimates of the effect of a policy or macro shock on any segment of the yield
curve, which an OLS estimation of equation (11) cannot provide. Finally, our term structure
model allows us to trace the predictability of risk premia in bond yields to macroeconomic or
monetary policy sources.
7The Taylor rule in equation (11) does not depend on the past level of the short rate.
Therefore, OLS regressions typically ﬁnd that the implied series of monetary policy shocks
from the benchmark Taylor rule, ε
MP,T
t , is highly persistent (see, for example, Rudebusch
and Svensson, 1999). The statistical reason for this ﬁnding is that the short rate is highly
autocorrelated, and its movements are not well explained by the right-hand side variables
in equation (11). This causes the implied shock to inherit the dynamics of the level of the
persistent short rate. In afﬁne term structure models, this ﬁnding is reﬂected by the properties
of the implied latent variables. In particular, ε
MP,T
t corresponds to δ1,ufu
t , which is the scaled
latent term structure variable. For example, Ang and Piazzesi (2003) show that the ﬁrst latent
factor implied by an afﬁnemodel with both latent factors and observable macro factors closely
corresponds to the traditionalﬁrst, highly persistent, latent factorin term structuremodels with
only unobservable factors. This latent variable also corresponds closely to the ﬁrst principal
component of yields, or the average level of the yield curve, which is highly autocorrelated.
2.4 Backward-Looking Taylor Rules
Eichenbaum and Evans (1995), Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1996), Clarida, Gal´ ı and
Gertler (1998), among others, consider modiﬁed Taylor rules that include current as well as
lagged values of macro variables and the previous short rate:





t istheimpliedmonetarypolicyshock fromthebackward-lookingTaylorrule. This
formulation has the statistical advantage that we compute monetary policy shocks recognizing
that the short rate is a highly persistent process. The economic mechanism behind such a
backward-looking rule may be that the objective of the central bank is to smooth interest rates
(see Goodfriend, 1991).
In the setting of our model, we can modify the short rate equation (3) to take the same
form as equation (12). Using the notation fo
t and fu
t to refer to the observable macro and latent
factors, respectively, we can rewrite the short rate dynamics (3) as:




















8Using equation (1), we can substitute for fu
t in equation (13) to obtain:











t−1 +Φ 22rt−1 + ε
MP,B
t , (14)
where we substitute for the dynamics of fu
t and deﬁne the backward-looking monetary policy
s h o c kt ob eε
MP,B
t ≡ δ1,uvu
t . Equation (14) expresses the short rate as a function of current
and lagged macro factors, fo
t and fo
t−1, the lagged short rate, rt−1, and a monetary policy shock
ε
MP,B
t . Equating the coefﬁcients in equations (12) and (14) allows us to identify the structural
coefﬁcients as:















γ2,r =Φ 22. (15)
Interestingly,the response to contemporaneousoutput gap and inﬂation captured by the δ1,o
coefﬁcient on fo
t in the backward-looking Taylor rule (14) is identical to the response in the
benchmark Taylor rule (11), because the δ1,o coefﬁcient is unchanged. The intuition behind
this result is that the short rate equation (3) describes the response of the short rate to current
macro factors. The latent factor, however, contains a predictable component that depends on
past values of the short rate and the macro factors. The backward-looking Taylor rule makes
this dependence explicit. Importantly, the backward-looking Taylor rule in equation (14) and
the benchmark Taylor rule (11) lead to observationally equivalent reduced-form dynamics for
interest rates and macro variables.
The implied monetary policy shocks from the backward-looking Taylor rule, ε
MP,B
t ,a r e
potentially very different from the benchmark shocks, ε
MP,T
t . In the no-arbitrage model, the
backward-looking monetary policy shock ε
MP,B
t is identiﬁed as the scaled shock to the latent
term structure factor, δ1,uvu
t . In the set-up of the factor dynamics in equation (1), the vu
t
shocks are IID. In comparison, the shocks in the standard Taylor rule (11), ε
MP,T
t are highly
autocorrelated. Note that the coefﬁcients on lagged macro variables in the extended Taylor
rule (14) are equal to zero only if δ1,uΦ 
21 = δ1,oΦ 
22. Under this restriction, the combined
movements of the past macro factors must exactly offset the movements in the lagged term
structure latent factor so that the short rate is affected only by unpredictable shocks.
Once our model is estimated, we can easily back out the implied extended Taylor rule (12)
from the estimated coefﬁcients. This is done by using the implied dynamics of fu














t is unconditionally correlated with the shocks to the macro factors fo
t ,
then OLS does not provide efﬁcient estimates of the monetary policy rule, and may provide
biased estimates of the Taylor rule in small samples.
2.5 Taylor Rules with Serially Correlated Policy Shocks
Backward-looking Taylor rules are observationally equivalent to a policy rule where the Fed
reacts to the entire history of macro variables, but with serially correlated errors. To see this,
we recursively substitute for rt−j,f o rj ≥ 1, in equation (14) to obtain:





where ct is a scalar, Ψt(L) is a polynomial of lag operators, and ε
MP,AR
t is a serially correlated
shock. The variables ct, Ψt(L),a n dε
MP,AR
t are given by:
























t are the innovations to the latent factor in the VAR in equation (1). The shock ε
MP,AR
t








Whereas in the backward-looking Taylor rule (14), the policy shocks are scaled innovations
of the latent factor, ε
MP,B
t = δ1,uvu
t , the autocorrelated policy errors ε
MP,AR
t are linear
combinations of current and past latent factor innovations in equation (16).1
1 Bikbov and Chernov (2005) use a projection procedure to also decompose latent factors into a macro-related
component and an innovation component with different statistical properties that can apply to models with more
than one latent factor.
102.6 Forward-Looking Taylor Rules
Finite-Horizon, Forward-Looking Taylor Rules
Clarida and Gertler (1997) and Clarida, Gal´ ı and Gertler (2000) propose a forward-looking
Taylor rule, where the Fed sets interest rates based on the expected future output gap and
expected future inﬂation over the next few quarters. For example, a forward-looking Taylor
rule using expected output gap and inﬂation over the next quarter takes the form:
rt = γ0 + γ1,gEt(gt+1)+γ1,πEt(πt+1)+ε
MP,F
t , (17)
where we deﬁne ε
MP,F
t to be the forward-looking Taylor rule monetary policy shock.
We can map the forward-looking Taylor rule (17) into the framework of an afﬁne term
structure model as follows. The conditional expectations of future output gap and inﬂation are
simply a function of current Xt that can be computed from the state dynamics (2):
Et(Xt+1)=μ +Φ Xt.
Denoting ei as a vector of zeros with a one in the ith position, we can write equation (17) as:
rt = γ0 +( γ1,ge1 + γ1,πe2)
 μ +( γ1,ge1 + γ1,πe2)
 ΦXt + ε
MP,F
t , (18)
as gt and πt are ordered as the ﬁrst and second elements in Xt.
Equation (18) is an afﬁneshort rateequation where the short ratecoefﬁcients are a function
of the parameters of the dynamics of Xt:















t with γ1,u = δ1,u. Hence, we can identify a forward-lookingTaylor rule by
redeﬁning the bond price recursions in equation (8) in terms of the new ¯ δ0 and ¯ δ1 coefﬁcients.
The complete term structure model is deﬁned by the same set-up as equations (2)-(5), except
we use the new short rate equation (19) that embodies the forward-lookingstructurein place of
the basic short rateequation (3). To the extent that lagged values of theoutput gap and inﬂation
help forecast their own futurevalues, the vector ¯ δ1 now has nonzero elements corresponding to
11the coefﬁcients on lagged macro variables. The relations in equation (19) explicitly show that
the forward-lookingTaylor rule structural coefﬁcients (γ0, γ1,g, γ1,π) impose restrictions on the
parameters of an afﬁne term structure model.
The new no-arbitrage bond recursions using the restricted coefﬁcients ¯ δ0 and ¯ δ1 reﬂect
the conditional expectations of output gap and inﬂation that enter in the short rate equation
(19). Furthermore,the conditional expectations Et(gt+1) and Et(πt+1) are those implied by the
underlying dynamics of gt and πt in the VAR process (2). The monetary policy shocks in the
forward-looking Taylor rule (17) or (18), ε
MP,F
t , can only be consistently estimated by OLS if
fu
t is orthogonal to the dynamics of gt and πt.
Since k-period ahead conditional expectations of output gap and inﬂation remain afﬁne
functions of the current state variables Xt, we can also specify a more general forward-looking
Taylor rule based on expected output gap or inﬂation over the next k quarters:
rt = γ0 + γ1,gEt(gt+k,k)+γ1,πEt(πt+k,k)+ε
MP,F
t , (20)












The forward-looking Taylor rule monetary policy shock ε
MP,F




t .A s C l a r i d a , G a l ´ ı and Gertler (2000) note, the general
case (20) also nests the benchmark Taylor rule (11) as a special case by setting k =0 .
Appendix Adetailstheappropriatetransformationsrequiredto map equation(20)into an afﬁne
term structure model and discusses the estimation procedure for a forward-lookingTaylor rule
based on a k-quarter horizon.
Inﬁnite-Horizon, Forward-Looking Taylor Rules
An alternative approach to ﬁxing some forecasting horizon k is to view the Fed as discounting
the entire expected path of future economic conditions. For simplicity, we assume that the Fed
discounts both expected future output gap and expected future inﬂation at the same discount
rate, β. In this formulation, the forward-lookingTaylor rule takes the form:
rt = γ0 + γ1,ˆ gˆ gt + γ1,ˆ πˆ πt + ε
MP,F
t , (21)
where ˆ gt and ˆ πt are inﬁnite sums of expected future output gap and inﬂation, respectively, both
discounted at rate β per period. Many papers have set β at one, or very close to one, sometimes
12motivated by calibrating it to an average real interest rate (see, among others, Rudebusch and
Svenson, 1999).
We can estimate the discount rate β as part of a standard term structure model by using the
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To place the forward-looking rule with discounting in a term structure model, we re-write
the short rate equation (3) as:
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Similarly,we modify the bond price recursions for the standard afﬁne model in equation (8) by
using the new ˆ δ0 and ˆ δ1 coefﬁcients that embody restrictions on β, γ0, γ1,ˆ g, γ1,ˆ π, μ,a n dΦ.
2.7 Forward- and Backward-Looking Taylor Rules
As a ﬁnal case, we combine the forward- and backward-looking Taylor rules, so that the
monetary policy rule is computed taking into account forward-looking expectations of macro
variables, lagged realizations of macro variables, while also controlling for lagged short rates.
We illustratetheruleconsidering expectations forinﬂation and output gap over thenext quarter
(k =1 ), but similar rules apply for other horizons.
We start with the standard forward-lookingTaylor rule in equation (17):








t+1)=[ E t(gt+1)E t(πt+1)]
  and ε
MP,F
t = γ1,ufu
t . We substitute for fu
t using
equation the implied short rate equation (19) that is implied by the forward-lookingTaylor rule
(17):

























where ¯ δ1,u is the coefﬁcient on fu
t in ¯ δ1.
Equation (23) expresses the short rate as a function of both expected future macro factors
and lagged macro factors, the lagged short rate, rt−1, and a forward- and backward-looking
monetary policy shock, ε
MP,FB
t = γ1,uvu
t . The forward- and backward-looking Taylor rule
(23) is an equivalent representation of the forward-looking Taylor rule in (17). Similar to how
the coefﬁcients on contemporaneous macro variables in the backward-looking Taylor rule (14)
are identical to the coefﬁcients in the benchmark Taylor rule (11), the coefﬁcients on future
expected macro variables in the forward- and backward-looking Taylor rule are exactly the
same as the corresponding coefﬁcients in the forward-lookingTaylor rule.
2.8 Summary of Taylor Rules
We can identify several structural policy rules from the same reduced-form term structure
model. Table 1 summarizes the various speciﬁcations. The benchmark, backward-looking
Taylor rules, and the Taylor rule with serially correlated shocks are different structural rules
that give rise to the same term structure dynamics. Similarly, the forward-looking and the
backward- and forward-lookingTaylor rules produce observationally equivalent term structure
models. In all cases, the monetary policy shocks are transformations of either levels or
innovationsofthelatenttermstructurevariable. Finally,thelast columnofTable1reportsifthe
no-arbitragemodel requires additional restrictions. The forward-lookingspeciﬁcations require
parameter restrictions in the short rate equation to ensure that we compute the expectations of
the macro variables consistent with the dynamics of the VAR.
3 Data and Econometric Methodology
The objective of this section is to brieﬂy discuss the data and the econometric methodology
used to estimate the model. We relegate all technical issues to Appendix B.
143.1 Data
To estimate the model, we use continuously compounded yields of maturities 1, 4, 8, 12, 16,
and 20 quarters, at a quarterly frequency. The bond yields of one year maturity and longer are
from the CRSP Fama-Bliss discount bond ﬁles, while the short rate (one-quarter maturity) is
taken from the CRSP Fama risk-free rate ﬁle. The sample period is June 1952 to December
2004. The consumer price index and real GDP numbers are taken from the Federal Reserve
Database (FRED) at Saint Louis. The output gap is computed by applying the Hodrick and
Prescott (1997) ﬁlter on quarterly real GDP using a smoothing parameter of 1,600. When we
estimate the model, we divide the Hodrick-Prescott output gap measure by 4 so that all the
variables are expressed in per quarter units.
In Figure 1, we plot the output gap, inﬂation and the short rate (all expressed in annual
units) over time and indicate recessions in solid bars deﬁned by the NBER. As expected, each
recession coincides with decreases in the output gap. Inﬂation and the short rate are strongly
positively correlated, at 70%, with both inﬂation and the short rate peaking during the early
and mid-1970s and the monetary targeting period from 1979-1983. In contrast, the short rate
is weakly correlated with the output gap, at 19%. Unconditionally,the output gap and inﬂation
arealmost uncorrelated,with acorrelationof1%, butthisdoes not capturethestronger lead-lag
effects of output and inﬂa t i o ni nt h eV A R ,w h i c hw es h o wb e l o w .
3.2 Estimation and Identiﬁcation
The VAR dynamics for the state vector in equation (1) are homoskedastic, and since bond
yields (7) in our model are linear in the state vector, they are also Gaussian. We deal with
potential time variation in volatilities and other parameters such as policy-rule coefﬁcients
(as documented by Clarida, Gal´ ı and Gertler, 2000) by estimating the model over different
subsamples. This approach assumes that bond investors form their expectations in equation
(6) based on recent data. They do not take into account that the economy may return to a
previously observed “regime.” For example, investors during the high-inﬂation Volcker years
did not anticipate that there would be a return to a low-inﬂation regime under Greenspan.
We estimate the term structure model using Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) and
Gibbssamplingmethods. Weassume thatallyieldsareobservedwitherror,so thattheequation










t is the model-implied yield from equation (7) and η
(n)
t is the zero-mean observation
error is IID across time and yields. We specify η
(n)
t to be normally distributed and denote the
standard deviation of the error term as σ
(n)
η .
A major advantage of the Bayesian estimation method is that it provides a posterior
distribution of the time-series path of fu
t and monetary policy shocks. That is, we can
computethe mean of theposterior distributionof the time-seriesof fu
t through thesample, and,
consequently, we can obtain a best estimate of implied monetary policy shocks. Importantly,
by not assigning one arbitrary yield to have zero measurement error (and the other yields to
have non-zero measurement error), we do not bias our estimated monetary policy shocks to
have undue inﬂuence from only one particular yield. Instead, the extracted latent factor reﬂects
the dynamics of the entire cross-section of yields.
Another advantage of our estimation method is tractability. Although the likelihood
function of yields and related variables can be written down, the model has high dimension
and is non-linear in the parameters. The maximum likelihood estimator involves a difﬁcult
optimization problem, whereas the Bayesian algorithm is based on a series of simulations that
are computationallymuch moretractable. In a Bayesian estimation setting, we can also specify
priors on reasonable regions of the parameter space that effectively rule out parameter values
that are economically implausible. In our estimation, the only informative prior we impose is
to constrain our state-space system to be stationary.
4 Empirical Results
Section 4.1 discusses the parameter estimates and the ﬁt of the model to data. Section 4.2
investigates the driving determinants of the yield curve. We compare benchmark, backward-
looking and forward-looking Taylor rules in Section 4.3. Section 4.4 discusses the implied
no-arbitrage monetary policy shocks.
4.1 Parameter Estimates
Table 2 presents the parameter estimates of the term structure model (1)-(5). The ﬁrst row
of the companion form Φ shows that the output gap is signiﬁcantly forecasted by the ﬁrst
lag of inﬂation. Similarly, a high lagged output gap signiﬁcantly Granger-causes high current
inﬂation. In the third row of Φ, both the lagged output gap and lagged inﬂation signiﬁcantly
16predict the latent factor. This is consistent with results in Ang and Piazzesi (2003), who show
that adding macro variables improves out-of-sample forecasts of interest rates. Naturally, the
diagonal coefﬁcients on the ﬁrst lag reveal that all the variables are highly autocorrelated.
With four lags of the output gap and inﬂation, many coefﬁcients for the output gap and
inﬂation corresponding to lags 3 to 4 are insigniﬁcant. Including the four lag structure is,
however, necessary for the model to provide sufﬁcient ﬂexibility for the model to ﬁt year-
on-year inﬂation with a quarterly frequency model. For example, the effect of the relatively
l a r g en e g a t i v ec o e f ﬁcient on the second lag of inﬂation predicting current inﬂation can only be
captured by adding complicated moving average error terms to a VAR system with only one
lag.
In Table 2, the estimated covariance matrix ΣvΣ 
v shows that the innovations to inﬂation
and the output gap are lowly correlated. The conditional covariances between the latent factor
and the macro factorsare not signiﬁcant. This implies that the commonrecursive identiﬁcation
strategyin low-frequencyVARs (see, for example, Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans, 1996)–
where macro factors do not respond contemporaneously to policy shocks – is automatically
satisﬁed, but not a priori imposed, and therefore not restrictive at our parameter estimates.
The short-rate coefﬁcients in δ1 are all positive, so higher inﬂation and output gap lead to
increases in theshort rate, which is consistent with the basic Taylor-ruleintuition. In particular,
a 1 percent increase in the output gap leads to an increase a 51 basis point (bp) increase in the
short rate, while the effect of a 1 percent increase in contemporaneous inﬂation leads to a 24bp
increase of the short rate. Below, we compare these magnitudes with OLS estimates of the
Taylor rule.
The risk premia parameters ¯ λ0 and ¯ λ1 indicate that macro-factor risk is signiﬁcantly priced
by the yield curve. There are signiﬁcant constant prices of risk for g and π in ¯ λ0.T h e r ea r e
also many signiﬁcant prices of time-varying risk in the ¯ λ1 matrix for all three factors. Hence,
the output gap, inﬂation, and the latent factor will play important roles in driving time-varying
expected excess returns, as we show below.
The standard deviations of the measurement errors are fairly large. For example, the
measurement-error standard deviation of the one-quarter yield (20-quarter yield) is 18bp (6bp)
per quarter. This is not surprising, because our system only has one latent factor. Interestingly,
short rateshave thelargest measurement-errorvariance. This ﬁnding suggests that thestandard
approach of backing out latent factors from data on selected yields by constraining these yields
to have zero measurement errorsmay lead to misspeciﬁcation, especially at the short end of the
17yield curve. Indeed, Piazzesi (2005) documents evidence for such misspeciﬁcation by showing
that short rates implied by standard three-factor models are only weakly correlated with those
in the data.
Finally, to summarize the dynamics of the VAR, we plot impulse responses of (gt πt rt) 
implied by the model in the left column of Figure 2. Note that the model VAR is speciﬁed
in terms of (gt πt fu
t ) , so to compute the effects of a 1-percent shock on rt,w ei n v e r tt h e
appropriate shock to fu
t so that the shocks from (gt πt fu
t )  sum to 1-percent in the short rate
equation (3) using a Cholesky decomposition that orders the variables as (gt πt fu
t ) .F o r
comparison, we contrast the model-implied impulse responses with the impulse responses
computed from an empirical VAR(4) on (gt πt rt)  in the right column of Figure 2. The
empirical VAR allows all lags of rt to be non-zero, unlike the model-implied VAR, which
constrains lags 2 to 4 of fu
t to be zero (see equation (1)).
The impulse responses generated by our model and the empirical VAR are very similar.
In both the model and the empirical VAR, inﬂation and the short rate increase after a positive
shock to the output gap, while the short rate increases after an inﬂation shock. However,
inﬂation dampens immediately after a 1% shock to r in the responses generated by our model,
while the empirical VAR has a very weak price puzzle (see comments by Sims, 1992) as
inﬂation initially slightly increases and then drops below zero about 10 quarters later. There
is no price puzzle in the model-implied VAR dynamics. Overall, we conclude that limiting
the model VAR to exclude lags of the latent factor as in equation (1) is inconsequential as it
captures the same macro variable dynamics.
Latent Factor Dynamics
The monetary policy shocks identiﬁed by no arbitrage depend crucially on the behavior of the
latent factor, fu
t . Figure 3 plots the latent factor together with the OLS Taylor rule residual and
the demeaned short rate. We plot the time-series of the latent factor posterior mean produced
from the Gibbs sampler. The plot illustrates the strong relationship between these three series.
The correlation of the time-series of the posterior mean of the latent factor with output gap
(inﬂation) is -0.10 (0.61). The corresponding correlation implied by the model posterior mean
point estimates is -0.08 (0.61), which is very similar to the correlations computed using the
posteriormean of thelatent factor. These strongcorrelationssuggest thatsimpleOLS estimates
of the Taylor rule (11) may be biased in small samples, which we investigate below. The
correlations between fu
t and the yields range between 94% (the short rate) and 98% (the 20-
18quarter yield). Hence, fu
t can be interpreted as level factor, similar to the ﬁndings of Ang and
Piazzesi (2003). In comparison, the correlation between fu
t and term spreads is near zero.
Matching Moments of Yields and Macro Variables
Table 3 reports the ﬁrst and second unconditional moments of yields and macro variables
computed from data and implied by the model. We compute standard errors of the data
estimates using GMM. We also report posterior standard deviations of the model-implied
moments. The moments computed from the model are well within two standard deviations
from their counterpartsin data for macro variables (Panel A), yields (Panel B), and correlations
(Panel C). Panel A showsthat the model providesan almost exact match with theunconditional
moments of inﬂation and output gap.
Panel B shows that the autocorrelations in data increase from 0.932 for the short rate to
0.962 for the 5-year yield. In comparison, the model-impliedautocorrelationsexhibit a smaller
rangein pointestimatesfrom0.964 for theshortrateto 0.962 forthe2-yearyield. However,the
model-implied estimates are well within two standard deviations of the data point estimates.
The smaller range of yield autocorrelations implied by the model is due to having only one
latent factor.
Panel C shows that the model is able to match the correlation of the short rate with output
gap and inﬂation present in the data. The correlation of the short rate with fu
t implied by the
model is 0.941. This implies that using the short rate to identify monetary policy shocks may
potentially lead to different estimates than the no-arbitrage shocks identiﬁed through fu
t .
4.2 What Drives the Dynamics of the Yield Curve?
From the yield equation (7), the variables in Xt explain all yield dynamics in our model. To
understand the role of each state variable in Xt, we compute variance decompositions from
the model and the data. These decompositions are based on Cholesky decompositions of the
innovation variance in the order [gt πtfu
t ].
Yield Levels
Panel A of Table 4 reports unconditional variance decompositions of yield levels for various
forecasting horizons. The columns under the heading “Risk Premia” report the proportion of
19the forecast variance attributable to time-varying risk premia. The remainder is the proportion
of the variance implied by the predictability embedded in the VAR dynamics without risk
premia, under the EH.
To compute the variance of yields due to risk premia, we partition the bond coefﬁcient bn






where we compute the bEH
n bond pricing coefﬁcient by setting the prices of risk λ1 =0 .W el e t
ΩF,h represent the forecast variance of the factors Xt at horizon h,w h e r eΩF,h = var(Xt+h −
Et(Xt+h)). Since yields are given by y
(n)
t = bn +b 
nXt, the forecast variance of the n-maturity
yield at horizonh is given by b 
nΩF,hbn. We compute the unconditional forecast variance using
a horizon of h = 100 quarters.
We decompose the forecast variance of yields as follows:







Note that this risk premia proportion reports only the pure risk premia term and ignores any
covariances of the risk premia with the state variables. Panel A of Table 4 shows that risk
premia play important roles in explaining the level of yields. Unconditionally, the pure risk
premia proportion of the 20-quarter yield is 30%. As the maturity increases, the importance of
the risk premia increases. Panel B shows that risk premia matter even more for yield spreads.
Over one half of the variance of yield spreads is due to time-varying risk premia.
The numbersundertheline“Variance Decompositions”reportthevariancedecompositions
for the total forecast variance, b 
nΩF,hbn and the pure risk premia variance, bRP
n ΩF,hbRP
n ,
respectively. The total variance decompositions reveal that, unconditionally, the shocks to
macro variables explain about 65-75% of the total variance of yield levels. Shocks to inﬂation
are slightly more important than shocks to output gap in explaining the forecast variance of
yield levels. In the pure risk premia term, the proportion of variance attributable to output gap
and inﬂation is also around 50%.
20Yield Spreads
Panel B of Table 4 reports variance decompositions of yield spreads of maturity n quarters in




t . The variance decompositions in Panel B document
that shocks to the macro variables are by far the main driving force of yield spreads, with the
unexplained latent factor portion being generally less than 10%. In particular, shocks to output
gap explain more than 62% of the variance of yield spreads and inﬂation shocks account for
approximately 20% of the unconditional variance of the 5-year spread.
Expected Excess Holding Period Returns
Panel C of Table 4 examines variance decompositions of expected excess holding period
returns. By deﬁnition, time-varying expected excess returns must be due only to time-varying
risk premia, which is why the total and pure risk premia variance decompositions are identical.
Panel C shows that the proportion of the expected excess return variance explained by macro
variables is about 50% for all maturities. Inﬂation is a little more important for explaining
time-varying excess returns than output gap, with the proportion for inﬂation reaching close to
33% for the 20-quarter bond. Thus, inﬂation and inﬂation risk impressively account for over
one half of the dynamics of expected excess returns.2
Table5 furthercharacterizesconditionalexpected excessreturns. PanelA reportsthemeans
and standard deviations of the approximate excess returns computed from data and implied by
the model. To compute the one-quarter excess returns on holding, say, the 20-quarter bond
from t to t +1 , we would need data on the price of the 19-quarter bond at t +1 . Because of
data availability, we implement the approximation by Campbell and Shiller (1991):









to their (approximate) counterparts in data. Hence, our model matches unconditional excess
returns almost exactly. The time-varying prices of risk are essential in this good ﬁt. If λ1 is set
2 We also estimated a simpler system using quarter-on-quarter GDP growth, quarter-on-quarter inﬂation
(measured usingthe GDP deﬂator), and a latentfactorwithonlyone lag inthe VAR. Thissystem produces similar
variance decompositionattributionsforyieldlevels and expected excess holdingperiodreturns,butassigns higher
variance decompositions to inﬂation than Table 4. This is because the output gap is more persistent than GDP
growth. Nevertheless, the proportionof the risk premia for yield levels, yield spreads, or excess returns, are very
similar using either outputgaps or GDP growth.
21to zero, the model’s ability to match excess returns deteriorates substantially, with the model
implied mean (standard deviation) of the excess return on the 20-quarter bond changing to
0.63% (2.78%), compared to 0.23% (3.30%) in the data.
Panel B reports regressions of (approximate) excess returns onto macro factors and yield
variables both in data and implied by the model. We choose the 20-quarter yield to be
representative of a level factor. The predictability of one-quarter excess returns is fairly weak,
compared to the results for longer holding periods reported by Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005).
Nevertheless, comparing the model-implied coefﬁcients with the data reveals that the model
is able to closely match the predictability patterns in the data. In particular, for the excess
returns of longer maturity bonds, the signiﬁcantly negative (positive) coefﬁcients on inﬂation
(the 20-quarter yield) are well within one standard deviation of their counterparts in data. The
point estimates of the loadings on the output gap and inﬂation both increase in magnitude with
maturity, indicating that long bond excess returns are more affected by macro factor variation.
Note that if λ1 were set to zero, the coefﬁcients in the Panel B regressions would be zero,
ignoring approximation and Jensen’s inequality terms.
Panel C reports the coefﬁcients of the conditional (exact) expected excess holding period
return deﬁned in equation (10). To make the coefﬁcients easier to interpret, we report the
summed coefﬁcients on all lags of g and π.T h eBx
n coefﬁcients on the contemporaneous and
lagged output gap and inﬂationare negative, indicatingthat conditional expected excess returns
are counter-cyclical. High output gaps and high inﬂation rates are more likely to occur during
the peaks of economic expansions, so excess returns of holding long-term bonds are lowest
during the peaks of economic expansions. The exposure to this counter-cyclical risk premium
also increases as the maturity of the bond increases.
Figure 4 plots the time-series of one-period expected excess holding period returns for the
4-quarter and 20-quarter bond. We compute the expected excess returns using the posterior
mean of the latent factors through the sample. Expected excess returns are much more volatile
for the long maturity bond, reaching a high of over 12% per year during the 1982 recession
and drop below -5% during 1953, 1973 and, 1978. In contrast, expected excess returns for
the 4-quarter bond lie in a more narrow range between -1.3% and 3.8% per year. During
every recession, expected excess returnsincrease. In particular, the increase in expected excess
returns for the 20-quarter bond at the onset of the 1981 recession is dramatic, rising from 4.0%
per year in March 1981 to 12.9% per year in December 1981.3
3 At 1981:Q4, the 12.9% expected excess return for the 20-quarter bond can be broken down into the various
proportions: 174% to the constant term premium, 10% to the outputgap, -65% to inﬂation,and -19% to the latent
224.3 A Comparison of Taylor Rules
We now compare the benchmark, backward-looking, and forward-looking Taylor rules
estimated by no-arbitrage techniques. We ﬁrst discuss the estimates of each Taylor rule in
turn, and then compare the monetary policy shocks computed from various speciﬁcations.
The Benchmark Taylor Rule
Panel A of Table 6 contrasts the OLS and model-implied estimates of the benchmark Taylor
rule in equation (11). Over the full sample, the OLS estimate of the output coefﬁcient is 0.34,
and this is highly signiﬁcant. The model-implied coefﬁcient is similar in magnitude at 0.51.
The OLS estimate of the inﬂation coefﬁcient is over twice as large at 0.90 and also strongly
signiﬁcant. In contrast, the model-implied coefﬁcient on πt of 0.24 is much smaller than the
OLS estimate. Hence, OLS over-estimates the response of the Fed on the short rate by over
two-thirds compared to the model-implied estimate.
There are two main reasons for the differences between the standard OLS estimate and
the model-implied coefﬁcients. First, the model accounts for the endogenous ﬂuctuations in
inﬂation and output, which are correlated with monetary policy shocks. This contemporaneous
correlation causes OLS coefﬁcients to be biased in small samples. Second, the model
estimation extracts information about the policy rule from the entire panel of yield data and
not only the time series of the short rate. This approach increases efﬁciency, which we can
see from the number in brackets reported below the model and OLS estimates in Table 6.
These numbers must be carefully compared since OLS regressions produce classical standard
errors, while Bayesian estimations produce posterior standard deviations, but we see that our
estimation produces tighter posterior standard deviations than regular OLS standard errors.
To further investigate the difference between OLS and model estimates, we compute the
OLS coefﬁcients and the OLS R2 of the benchmark Taylor rule implied by the model, i.e.,
the model-implied OLS coefﬁcients on gt and πt while omitting the latent factor fu
t from
the equation. These coefﬁcients are 0.005 for the constant, 0.37 (0.91) for the output gap
(inﬂation) – almost identical to the OLS regression coefﬁcients. Moreover, the model-implied
OLS regression R2 is 57%, very similar to the OLS R2 of 52%. These results suggest that the
larger magnitude of the OLS regression estimate of the inﬂation coefﬁcient in the benchmark
factor. Note that there is a large exposure, in absolute values, to the macro factors. Although the exposure to
the latent factor is large at this date, the implied monetary policy shock is much smaller, as it is the scaled latent
factor, δ1,ufu
t . We discuss this below in further detail.
23Taylor rule compared to the model-implied coefﬁcient is due to an omitted variable that is
correlated with output gap and inﬂation.
Byestimatingthemodel over thefullsample, wefollowChristiano,Eichenbaum and Evans
(1996), and others, who all assume that the Taylor rule relationships are stable. Interestingly,
our results for the benchmark Taylor rule are indeed fairly stable when we estimate the
model across different subsamples. (Below we show that this result does not apply to other
speciﬁcations of theTaylor rule.) Panel A of Table 6 reportsestimates of bothOLS Taylor rules
and the benchmark Taylor rule estimated by no-arbitrage restrictions over the pre-1982 and
post-1983 monetary policy regimes.4 For example, the model (OLS) coefﬁcient on inﬂation
is 0.23 (0.98) over the pre-1982 sample and 0.52 (1.83) over the post-1983 sample, compared
with 0.24 (0.90) over the whole sample. The model coefﬁcients on output gap are also fairly
stable, at 0.41 (0.46) over the pre-1982 (post-1982) period. In contrast, the OLS coefﬁcient
on output gap differs widely across the samples, ranging from 0.28 in the pre-1982 sample
to 0.55 in the post-1982 sample. Hence, the OLS coefﬁcients of output gap are much more
dissimilar across the pre-1982 and post-1983 samples compared to the no-arbitrageTaylor rule
estimation.
The Backward-LookingTaylor Rule
Panel B of Table 6 reports the estimation results for the backward-looking Taylor rule.
Consistent with equation (14), the model coefﬁcients on gt and πt are unchanged from the
benchmark Taylor rule in Panel A at 0.51 and 0.24, respectively. The corresponding OLS
estimates of the backward-looking Taylor rule coefﬁcients on output gap and inﬂation are
0.38 and 0.32, respectively. Here, OLS estimates of the backward-looking rule are closer
to the model-implied estimates compared to the benchmark Taylor rule, particularly for
contemporaneous and lagged inﬂation.
As expected, the coefﬁcients on the lagged short rate in both the OLS estimates and the
model-implied estimates are similar to the autocorrelation of the short rate (0.93 in Table 3).
The large and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient on the lagged short rate reﬂects interest-rate smoothing.
We can rewrite the backward-looking Taylor rule in partial-adjustment format as follows:
rt =( 1− 0.911)(5.719gt +2 .674πt − 4.180gt−1 − 1.393πt−1)+0 .911rt−1 + ε
MP,B
t .
4 Several recent studies have emphasized that the linear policy coefﬁcients on the output gap and inﬂation
potentially vary over time (see, among others, Cogley and Sargent, 2001). However, other authors like Sims and
Zha (2006) ﬁnd either littleor no evidence for time-varying policy rules.
24Hence, our model implies a long-run response to inﬂation of 2.674 − 1.393 = 1.281.T h i si s
consistent with the Taylor principle that the coefﬁcient on inﬂation should be larger than one
(see comments by Taylor, 1999).
As already mentioned above, we ﬁnd that the estimates of the backward-looking Taylor
rule change across subsamples. Panel B in Table 6 shows that interest-rate smoothing is more
important in the post-1983 sample than in the pre-1982 sample. The coefﬁcient on the lagged
interest rate goes up from 0.87 to 0.94 in the model estimation. We also ﬁnd that the model
estimation ﬁnds a higher long-run response to inﬂation in the more recent sample than in the
earlier sample. These ﬁndings – more recently, both interest-rate smoothing and the inﬂation
response have become stronger – are consistent with those by Clarida, Gal´ ı and Gertler (2000).
The Taylor Rule with Serially Correlated Shocks
Figure 5 plots the monetary policy shocks of the Taylor rule with serially correlated errors (see
equation (16)) as well as the OLS Taylor rule residual for comparison. Not surprisingly, the
serially correlated shocks are much smoother. As a measure of how much predictablevariation
is contained in the short rate as it responds to contemporaneous and lagged macro variables,
we plot the ﬁtted short rate implied from the seriallycorrelated Taylor rulein the bottom panel.
From equation (16), we can construct a ﬁtted short rate, rAR
t ,w h e r e
r
AR
t = ct +Ψ t(L)f
o
t
is the predictable variation in the short rate from the entire past history of macro factors. The
ﬁtted short rate bears a very high resemblance to the level of the short rate in data, and the
R2 of regressing the short rate in data onto rAR
t is over 71%. Thus, although short rates do
not resemble contemporaneous output gap or inﬂation, in a serially correlated Taylor rule, the
entire past history of output gap and inﬂation contains a lot of information about the level of
the short rate.
The Finite-Horizon, Forward-Looking Taylor Rule
In Panel C of Table 6, we list the estimates of the forward-looking Taylor rule coefﬁcients
γ1,g and γ1,π in equation (20) for various horizons k. For all the forward-looking Taylor rules,
we re-estimate the term structure model holding the μ, Φ,a n dΣ in equation (2) ﬁxed to the
same values as the benchmark estimation, but only report the forward-looking Taylor rule
coefﬁcientsforcomparison. A differentestimationisperformedforeach horizonk. By holding
25the VAR parameters constant across the speciﬁcations, we concentrate only on the effect of
different horizons in the forward-looking Taylor rule, but allow best ﬁts to the prices of risk
across the term structure.
For a one-quarterahead forward-lookingTaylor rule, thecoefﬁcient on expected outputgap
(inﬂation) is 0.59 (0.29). These are larger than the contemporaneous responses for output gap
and inﬂation over the past quarter in the benchmark Taylor rule, which are 0.51 and 0.24,
respectively. For a one-year (k =4 ) horizon, the short interest rate responds even more
aggressively to output gap and inﬂation expectations, with γ1,g =0 .74 and γ1,π =0 .37.T h e
response of the Fed to future inﬂation expectations increases quickly as the horizon increases.
As k increases, the posterior standard deviations increase so that the γ1,g and γ1,π
coefﬁcients become less precisely estimated. As k becomes large, the conditional expectations
approach their unconditional expectations, or Et(gt+k,k) → E(gt) and Et(πt+k,k) → E(πt).
Econometrically, this makes γ1,g and γ1,π hard to identify for large k, and unidentiﬁed in the
limit as k →∞ . The intuition behind this result is that as k →∞ , the only variable driving
the dynamics of the short rate in equation (20) is the latent monetary policy shock:
rt = γ0 + γ1,gE(gt)+γ1,πE(πt)+ε
MP,F
t ,
and in the limit as k →∞ , it is impossible to differentiate the (scaled) effect of output gap or
inﬂation expectations from γ0.
The Inﬁnite-Horizon,Forward-Looking Taylor Rule
We report the estimates of the inﬁnite-horizon, forward-looking Taylor rule (21) in Panel D of
Table 6. The coefﬁcient on futurediscounted output gap (inﬂation)is 0.17 (0.05). The discount
rate β =0 .857, which implies an effective horizon of 1/(1 − 0.857) quarters, or 1.75 years.
This estimate is much lower than the discount rates close to 0.99 used in the literature (see,
for example, Rudebusch and Svenson, 1999; Favero and Rovelli, 2003), but still much higher
than the estimate of 0.76 calibrated by Collins and Siklos (2004). The effective horizon of
approximately two years is consistent with transcripts of FOMC meetings, which indicate that
the Fed often weighs forecasts and policy scenarios of up to three to ﬁve years ahead.
The Forward- and Backward-Looking Taylor Rule
For completeness, Panel E of Table 6 reports the estimates of the forward- and backward-
looking Taylor rule for horizons of k =1and k =4quarters. These are the same restricted
26estimations as the forward-lookingTaylor rules in Panel C for the corresponding horizons and,
hence, have the same coefﬁcients on Et(gt+k,k) and Et(πt+k,k) as explained in Section 2.7.
Naturally, the lagged short rate continues to play a large role. The summed coefﬁcients on
the lagged output gap and inﬂation variables cannot be as easily interpreted as the coefﬁcients
on the ﬁrst lag of macro variables in the backward-looking rule. Nevertheless, the relatively
large magnitude of these coefﬁcients suggest that for traditional forward-looking Taylor rule
estimates which use instruments for Et(gt+k,k) and Et(πt+k,k), long lags of macro variables
would still be necessary to capture the endogenous correlated effects of latent monetary policy
shocks.
4.4 An Example of No-Arbitrage Monetary Policy Shocks
The monetary policy shocks identiﬁed by no arbitrage are transformations of either levels or
innovationsof thelatent factor. Therearedifferentno-arbitragepolicy shocks depending on the
chosen structural speciﬁcation, like benchmark, forward-looking, or backward-looking Taylor
rules. Note that the implied policy shock is a choiceof a particularstructural rule, and the same
reduced-form no-arbitrage model can produce several versions of monetary policy shocks (see
Table 1).
As an example, we graph the model-implied monetary policy shocks based on the
backward-looking Taylor rule in Figure 6 and contrast them with OLS estimates of the
backwardTaylor rule. We plottheOLS estimatein thetop panel and themodel-impliedshocks,
ε
MP,B
t , from equation (14) in the bottom panel. We compute ε
MP,B
t using the posterior mean
estimates of the latent factor through time. Figure 6 shows that the model-implied shocks
are much smaller than the shocks estimated by OLS. In particular, during the early 1980s,
the OLS shocks range from below -6% to above 4%. In contrast, the model-implied shocks
lie between -3% and 2% during this period. This indicates that according to the no-arbitrage
estimates, the Volcker-experiencewas not as big a surprise as suggested by OLS. These results
are consistent with our ﬁndings that the pre-1982 and post-1983 estimates of the Taylor rule
using no-arbitrage identiﬁcation techniques are quite similar.
5C o n c l u s i o n
We exploit information from the entire term structure to estimate monetary policy rules. The
framework accommodates original Taylor (1993) rules that describe the Fed as reacting to
27current values of output gap and inﬂation; backward-looking Taylor rules where the Fed reacts
to currentand lagged macrovariablesand laggedpolicy rates; and forward-lookingTaylorrules
where the Fed takes into account conditional expectations of future real activity and inﬂation.
The framework also accommodates Taylor rules with serially correlated policy shocks. An
advantage of this approach is that all these types of Taylor rules can be estimated jointly in a
uniﬁed system that provides consistent expectations of future interest rates and macro factors.
Our methodology embeds the Taylor rules in a term structure model with time-varyingrisk
premia that excludes arbitrage opportunities. The absence of arbitrage implies that long yields
areexpected valuesof futureshort ratesafter adjusting for risk. The tractabilityof thesystem is
based on ﬂexible VAR dynamics for the macro and latent state variables and by specifying risk
premia that are also linear combinations of the VAR state variables. In our model, monetary
policy shocks are transformations of either levels or innovations to the latent factor, depending
on the Taylor rule speciﬁcation. The cross-equation restrictions implied by no arbitrage help
us to estimate this shock more efﬁciently.
We ﬁnd that output gap and inﬂation shocks account for over half of the time-variation
of time-varying excess bond returns and almost all of the movements in the term spread.
Macro factors induce a counter-cyclical risk premium for holding long-term bonds. We
ﬁnd that monetary policy rules identiﬁed by no-arbitrage are more stable over time than
classical estimates of Taylor (1993) rule coefﬁcients. Monetary policy shocks implied by
backward-looking policy rules estimated with no-arbitrage restrictions are less volatile than
their counterparts estimated by OLS. Interesting extensions of our approach are to impose
more structure on the VAR dynamics, to expand the state space to include other macro factors,
or to embed the no-arbitrage identiﬁcation techniques in more structural models.
28Appendix
A Forward-Looking Taylor Rules
In this appendix, we describe how to compute ¯ δ0, ¯ δ1 in equation (19) of a forward-looking Taylor rule for a k-
quarter horizon. From the dynamics of Xt in equation (2), the conditional expectation of k-quarter ahead GDP



































˜ Φiμ + ˜ ΦkΦXt
 
, (A-1)




Φj =( I − Φ)−1(I − Φi). (A-2)
The bond price recursions for the standard afﬁne model in equation (8) are thus based on the short rate equation
rt = ¯ δ0 + ¯ δ 
1 Xt,w h e r e :














[γ1,ge1 γ1,πe2] ˜ ΦkΦ+γ1,ue 
3 . (A-3)
As k →∞ , both Et(gt+k,k) and Et(πt+k,k) approach their unconditional means and there is no state-
dependence. Hence, the limit of the short rate equation in equation (20) as k →∞is:
rt = γ0 +[ γ1,ge1 γ1,πe2]




whichimpliesthatwhen k islarge, theshort rate effectively becomes a functiononly of fu
t ,a n dgt and πt can only
indirectlyaffect the term structurethroughthe feedback in the VAR equation (2). In the limitingcase k = ∞,t h e
coefﬁcients γ1,g and γ1,π are unidentiﬁed because they act exactly like the constant term γ0.
B Estimating the Model
We estimate the model by MCMC with a Gibbs sampling algorithm. The parameters of the model are Θ=
(μ, Φ, Σ,δ 0,δ 1,μ Q, ΦQ,σ η),w h e r eμQ and ΦQ are parameters governing the state variable process under the
risk neutral probabilitymeasure, ση denotes the vector of observation error volatilities{σ
(n)
η }.W ed r a wμQ and
ΦQ,b u ti n v e r tλ0 and λ1 using λ0 =Σ −1(μ − μQ),a n dλ1 =Σ −1(Φ − ΦQ). The latent factor fu = {fu
t } is
also generated in each iteration of the Gibbs sampler. We simulate 50,000 iterationsof the Gibbs sampler after an
initialburn-in period of 10,000 observations.
We now detail the procedure for drawing each of these variables. We denote the factors X = {Xt} and the
set of yields for all maturities in data as ˆ Y = {ˆ y
(n)
t }. Note that the model-implied yields Y = {y
(n)
t } differ from
the yields in data, ˆ Y by observation error. Note that observing X is equivalent to observing the term structure Y
through the bond recursions in equation (8).
29Drawing the Latent Factor fu
The factordynamics (2), togetherwiththeyield equations(24), implythattheterm structuremodelcan bewritten
as a state-space system. The state and observation equations for the system are linear in fu
t , but also involve the
macro variables gt and πt. To generate fu, we use the Carter and Kohn (1994) forward-backward algorithm.
We ﬁrst run the Kalman ﬁlter forward taking the macro variables (gt,π t) to be exogenous variables, and then
sample fu backwards. We use a Kalman ﬁlter algorithm that includes time-varying exogenous variables in the
state equation. Since we specify the mean of fu to be zero for identiﬁcation, we set each generated draw of fu to
have a mean of zero.
Drawing μ and Φ
We followJohannes and Polson(2005) and explicitlydifferentiatebetween {μ,Φ} and {μQ,ΦQ}.A sXt follows
a VAR in equation (2), the draw of μ and Φ is standard Gibbs sampling with conjugate normal priors and
posteriors. We note that the posterior of μ and Φ conditionalon X, ˆ Y and the other parameters is:
P(μ,Φ | Θ−,X,ˆ Y) ∝ P(ˆ Y | Θ,X)P(X | μ,Φ,Σ)P(μ,Φ) (B-1)
∝ P(ˆ Y | Σ,δ 0,δ 1,μ Q,ΦQ,σ η,X)P(X | μ,Φ,Σ)P(μ,Φ)
∝ P(X | μ,Φ,Σ)P(μ,Φ),
where Θ− denotes the set of all parameters except μ and Φ. P(X|μ,Φ,Σ) is the likelihood function, which is
normally distributed from the assumption of normality for the errors in the VAR. The validity of going from the
ﬁrst line to the second line is ensured by the bond recursion in equation (8): given μQ and ΦQ, the bond price is
independent of μ and Φ.W es p e c i f yt h ep r i o rP(μ,Φ) to be N(0,1000), so, consequently, the posterior of (μ,Φ)
is a natural conjugatenormal distributionand the draw of μ and Φ is standard Gibbs sampling. We draw μ and Φ
separately for each equation in the VAR system (2).
Drawing ΣΣ 
To draw ΣΣ , we note that the posterior of ΣΣ  conditional on X, ˆ Y and the other parameters is:
P(ΣΣ  | Θ−,X,ˆ Y) ∝ P(ˆ Y | Θ,X)P(X | μ,Φ,Σ)P(ΣΣ ), (B-2)
where Θ− denotes the set of all parameters except Σ. This posterior suggests an Independence Metropolis draw.
We draw ΣΣ  from the proposaldensity q(ΣΣ )=P(X | μ,Φ,Σ)P(ΣΣ ), which is an Inverse Wishart (IW)
distributionif we specify the priorP(ΣΣ ) to be IW,s ot h a tq(ΣΣ ) is an IW natural conjugate. The proposal
draw (ΣΣ )m+1 for the (m +1 ) th draw is then accepted with probabilityα,w h e r e
α =m i n
 
P((ΣΣ )m+1 | Θ−,X,ˆ Y)







P(ˆ Y | (ΣΣ )m+1,Θ−,X)




where P(ˆ Y|μ,Φ,Θ−,X) is the likelihood function, which is normally distributed from the assumption of
normality for the observation errors η(n). From equation (B-3), α is just the ratio of the likelihoods of the new
draw of ΣΣ  relative to the old draw.
Drawing δ1




1 + ζδ1v (B-4)
where v ∼ N(0,1) and ζδ1 is the scaling factor used to adjust the acceptance rate. The acceptance probabilityα
30for δ1 is given by:
α =m i n
 
P(δm+1
1 | Θ−,X,ˆ Y)
P(δm













1 | Θ−,X,ˆ Y)
P(δm




where the posterior P(δ1|Θ−,X,ˆ Y ) is given by:
P(δ1|Θ−,X,ˆ Y ) ∝ P(ˆ Y |δ1,Θ−,X)P(δ1).
Thus, in the case of the draw for δ1, α is the posteriorratio of thenew and old draws of δ1.W es e tδ0 to match the
sample mean of the short rate.
To draw γ1 in the forward-lookingTaylor rule system, we rewrite the short rate in data as a regression:
ˆ y
(1)
t = γ0 + γ 
1 ¯ Xt + η
(1)
t ,
where ¯ Xt =[ E t(gt+k,k Et(πt+k,k) fu
t ] , and we can compute the conditionalexpectations for GDP growth and
inﬂation implied from the VAR parameters at every date t. We generate a proposal draw from the regression for
γ1, and then accept/reject based on the likelihood of the bond yields. We ﬁrst draw a proposal for the (m +1 ) th
value of γ1 from the proposal density:
q(γ1) ∝ P(ˆ y
(1)
t | γ0,γ 1,X,η (1))P(γ1),
where we specify the priorP(γ1) tobe normallydistributed,so, consequently, q(γ1) is a naturalconjugatenormal
distribution. The proposal draw γ
m+1
1 , is then accepted with probabilityα,w h e r e




1 | Θ−,X,ˆ Y)
P(γm










P(ˆ Y− | γ
m+1
1 ,Θ−,X)





where P( ˆ Y−|γ1,Θ−,X) is the likelihood function of yields other than the short rate ˆ r, which is normally
distributed from the assumption of normality for the observation errors η(n).W e s e t γ0 to match the sample
mean of the short rate.
Drawing μQ and ΦQ
We draw μQ and ΦQ witha Random Walk Metropolisalgorithm. We assume a ﬂat prior. We draw each parameter
separately in μQ, and each row in ΦQ. The accept/reject probability for the draws of μQ and ΦQ is similar to
equation (B-5). In each iteration, we invert λ0 and λ1 and report the estimates of the prices of risk instead of μQ
and ΦQ, as it is easier to interpret market prices of risk than parameters under the risk-neutral measure.
Drawing ση
Drawing the variance of the observationerrors, σ2
η, is straightforward,because we can view the observation errors
η as regressionresidualsfromequation(24). Wedraw theobservationvariance(σ
(n)
η )2 separately fromeach yield.
We specify a conjugatepriorIG(0,0.00001),so that the posteriordistributionof σ2
η is a natural conjugateInverse
Gamma distribution. The prior information roughly translates into a 30bp bid-ask spread in Treasury securities,
which is consistent withstudies on the liquidityof spot Treasury market yields(see, for example, Fleming, 2000).
Drawing β
For the case of the forward-looking Taylor rule over an inﬁnite horizon with discounting, we augment the
parameter space to include the discount rate, β.T o d r a wβ, we use an Independence Metropolis-Hastings step.
31The candidate draw, βm+1, is drawn from a proposal density, q(βm+1 | βm)=q(βm+1), which we specify to
be a doubly truncated normal distribution, with mean 0.95 and standard deviation 0.03 but truncated at 0.8 from
below and at 0.99 from above.
Assuming a ﬂat prior, the acceptance probabilityα for βm+1is given by:
α =m i n
 








P(ˆ Y | βm+1,Θ−,X)






where Θ− represents all the parameters except the β parameter that is being drawn and P(ˆ Y |β,Θ−,X) is the
likelihoodfunction.
Scaling Factors and Accept Ratios
The table below lists the scaling factors and acceptance ratios used in the Random Walk Metropolis steps for the
benchmark Taylor rule and backward-lookingTaylor rule estimation.
Scaling Acceptance Scaling Acceptance
Parameter Factor Ratio Parameter Factor Ratio






















3 )  and Φ
Q
i,. denotes the element of ΦQ in the ith row.
Checks for Convergence
To check thereliabilityof our estimationapproach, we performseveral exercises. First,we triedstartingthechain
from many different initial values on real data and we obtained almost exactly the same results for the posterior
means and standard deviationsof the parameters. We also check thatthe posteriordistributionsfor the parameters
Θ are unimodal.
Second, we compute the Raftery and Lewis (1992) minimum burn-in and the minimum number of runs
required to estimate the 0.025 quantile to within ±0.025 with probability 0.95, using every draw in the MCMC-
Gibbs algorithm, which is conservative. For all the parameters (with one exception) and the complete time-series
of the latent factors fu, the minimum required burn-in is only several hundred and the minimum number of runs
is several thousand. This is substantiallybelow the burn-insample (10,000) and the number of iterations(50,000)
for our estimation.
The third, and probably most compelling check of the estimation method is that the MCMC-Gibbs sampler
works very well on simulated data. We take the posterior means of the parameters in Table 2 as the population
values and simulate a small sample of 203 quarterly observations, which is the same length as our data. Applying
our MCMC algorithm to the simulated small sample, we ﬁnd that the draws of the VAR parameters (μ,Φ,Σ),
the short rate parameters (δ0,δ 1), the constant prices of risk (λ0), and the observation error standard deviations
(σ
(n)
η ) converge extremely fast. After our estimation procedure, the posterior means for these parameters are
all well within one posterior standard deviation of the population parameters. We ﬁnd that a burn-in sample of
only 1,000 observations is sufﬁcient to start drawing values for these parameters that closely correspond to the
populationdistributions. The time-varyingprices of risk (λ1) were estimated less precisely on the simulated data,
but the posteriormeans of eight out of nine prices of risk were also within one posterior standard deviationof the
populationparameters. The algorithmisalso successful in estimating thetime-series of the latent factor fu,w h e r e
t h et r u es e r i e so ffu in the simulated sample lies within one posterior standard deviation bound of the posterior
mean of the generated fu from the Gibbs sampler.
32In summary, these results verify that we can reliably estimate the parameters of the term structure model
given our sample size and, thus, we are very conﬁdent about the convergence of our algorithm.
Econometric Identiﬁcation
For our benchmark model, our identiﬁcation strategy is to set the mean of fu
t to be zero and to pin down δ1,u
while the conditional variance matrix ΣΣ  is unconstrained. To ensure that fu
t is mean zero, we parameterize
μ =[ μg μπ μf]
  so that μf solves the equation:
e 
3 (I − Φ)−1μ =0 ,
where e3 is a vector of zeros with a one in the third position. We set δ1,u =1 .W eﬁnd that ﬁxing δ1,u to other
values does not change the estimates of δ1,o because the latent factor can be arbitrarily scaled.
To match the mean of the short rate in the sample, we set δ0 in each Gibbs iteration so that:
δ0 =¯ r − δ 
1 ¯ X, (B-8)
where ¯ r is the average short rate from data and ¯ X is the time-series average of the factors Xt, which change
because fu
t is drawn in each iteration. This means that δ0 is not individuallydrawn as a separate parameter, but
δ0 changes its value in each Gibbs iteration because it is a function of δ1 and the draws of the latent factor fu
t .
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36Table 2: PARAMETER ESTIMATES
Factor Dynamics
Companion Form Φ
μg t−1 πt−1 fu
t−1 gt−2 πt−2 gt−3 πt−3 gt−4 πt−4
gt 0.022 1.037 0.333 0.011 -0.141 -0.453 -0.153 0.298 -0.069 -0.206
(0.032) (0.072) (0.189) (0.031) (0.103) (0.326) (0.102) (0.319) (0.072) (0.183)
πt 0.014 0.060 1.443 -0.012 0.005 -0.449 -0.007 -0.048 0.015 0.040
(0.000) (0.028) (0.073) (0.012) (0.040) (0.127) (0.039) (0.124) (0.028) (0.071)
fu
t - 0 . 0 8 1 0 . 0 9 1 0 . 0 9 3 0 . 9 1 1 000000




g 0.395 0.013 -0.035
(0.041) (0.011) (0.035)
π 0.013 0.057 -0.007
(0.011) (0.006) (0.012)




δ0 gt πt fu
t
0.011 0.509 0.238 1.000
(0.001) (0.044) (0.079) –
Risk Premia Parameters
¯ λ1
¯ λ0 gt πt fu
t gt−1 πt−1 gt−2 πt−2 gt−3 πt−4
g -1.39 84.3 59.7 -74.5 81.6 20.9 -59.6 -42.2 -116 -8.32
(0.38) (47.7) (98.8) (21.0) (55.3) (164) (53.2) (161) (68.6) (92.8)
π 1.29 25.7 -20.0 -53.5 -143 205 -92.4 -18.4 179 -99.8
( 0.38) (81.1) (108) (66.1) (73.4) (190) (70.5) (174.9) (61.0) (126)
fu -0.31 -14.3 0.76 -24.0 12.7 30.2 -4.00 4.21 37.9 -0.26
( 0.22) (29.5) (26.1) (18.1) (18.0) (36.5) (18.6) (34.5) (20.7) (20.6)
Observation Error Standard Deviation
n =1 n =4 n =8 n =1 2 n =1 6 n =2 0
σ
(n)
η 0.177 0.111 0.056 0.034 0.046 0.064
(0.009) (0.006) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
Note: The table lists parameter values for the model in equations (2)-(5) and observation error standard
deviations in equation (24) for yields of maturity n quarters. We use 50,000 simulations after a burn-in
sample of 10,000 for the Gibbs sampler. We report the posterior mean and posterior standard deviation (in
parentheses) of each parameter. The sample period is June 1952 to December 2004 and the data frequency is
quarterly.
37Table 3: SUMMARY STATISTICS
PANEL A: MOMENTS OF MACRO FACTORS
Means % Standard Deviations % Autocorrelations
Data Model Data Model Data Model
g 0.000 -0.010 0.400 0.428 0.841 0.847
(0.051) (0.078) (0.033) (0.047) (0.041) (0.024)
π 0.866 0.875 0.567 0.675 0.984 0.986
(0.086) (0.509) (0.066) (0.256) (0.026) (0.005)
PANEL B: MOMENTS OF YIELDS
n =1 n =4 n =8 n =1 2 n =1 6 n =2 0
Means
Data 1.307 1.412 1.464 1.507 1.540 1.560
(0.108) (0.109) (0.108) (0.105) (0.104) (0.103)
Model 1.307 1.402 1.462 1.509 1.540 1.559
– (0.006) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
Standard Deviations
Data 0.731 0.733 0.722 0.702 0.694 0.682
(0.091) (0.082) (0.081) (0.079) (0.079) (0.076)
Model 0.721 0.718 0.714 0.706 0.692 0.675
(0.009) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
Autocorrelations
Data 0.932 0.940 0.949 0.955 0.959 0.962
(0.031) (0.030) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.025)
Model 0.964 0.963 0.962 0.963 0.963 0.964
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
PANEL C: SHORT RATE CORRELATIONS
gπ f u
Data 0.188 0.696 –
(0.138) (0.075)
r 0.228 0.714 0.941
(0.124) (0.134) (0.031)
Note: Panel A lists moments of the output gap and inﬂation in data and implied by the model. For the
model, we construct the posterior distribution of unconditional moments by computing the unconditional
moments implied from the parameters in each iteration of the Gibbs sampler. Panel B reports data and model
unconditional moments of n-quarter maturity yields. We compute the posterior distribution of the model-
implied yields using the generated latent factors in each iteration. In Panel C, we report correlations of the
short rate with various factors. For the model, we compute the posterior distribution of the correlations of
the model-implied short rate r in equation (3). In all the panels, the data standard errors (in parentheses) are
computed using GMM and all moments are computed at a quarterly frequency. For the model, we report
posterior means and standard deviations(in parentheses) of each moment. The sample period is June 1952to
December 2004 and the data frequency is quarterly.
38Table 4: VARIANCE DECOMPOSITIONS
Variance Decompositions
Total Risk Premia
Maturity(qtrs) Risk Premia gπ f u gπ f u
PANEL A: YIELD LEVELS y
(n)
t
1 0.0 35.4 38.4 26.2 – – –
4 2.0 32.9 38.4 28.8 22.4 28.9 48.7
8 8.4 30.4 37.8 31.8 11.4 30.9 57.7
12 16.0 28.9 37.7 33.4 11.3 29.0 59.7
16 23.1 28.2 37.8 34.0 12.4 27.8 59.7
20 29.5 27.8 38.0 34.2 13.2 27.1 59.7





4 52.7 62.2 28.3 9.5 22.4 28.9 48.7
8 55.7 68.2 21.1 10.8 11.4 30.9 57.7
12 55.4 73.1 19.9 7.0 11.3 29.0 59.7
16 53.2 76.6 20.1 3.4 12.4 27.8 59.7
20 50.2 78.0 20.8 1.1 13.2 27.1 59.7
PANEL C: EXPECTED EXCESS HOLDING PERIOD RETURNS Et(rx
(n)
t+1)
4 100 24.3 28.1 47.6 24.3 28.1 47.6
8 100 19.8 30.5 49.7 19.8 30.5 49.7
12 100 18.6 31.6 49.8 18.6 31.6 49.8
16 100 18.2 32.4 49.3 18.2 32.4 49.3
20 100 18.3 32.9 48.8 18.3 32.9 48.8
Note: The table reports unconditionalvariance decompositionsof forecast variance (in percentages) for yield
levels y
(n)









t − (n −1)y
(n−1)
t+1 − rt) in Panel C. In each panel, we also examine the variance
decomposition due to time-varying risk premia. By deﬁnition, the variance decompositions of time-varying
expected excess holding period returns must be due only to time-varying risk premia. All maturities are
in quarters. We ignore observation error for computing variance decompositions for yield levels and yield
spreads. All the variance decompositions are computed using the posterior mean of the parameters listed in
Table 2.
39Table 5: CHARACTERIZING EXCESS RETURNS
PANEL A: MOMENTS OF EXCESS RETURN
n =4 n =8 n =1 2 n =1 6 n =2 0
Means
Data 0.102 0.149 0.188 0.212 0.226
(0.047) (0.102) (0.149) (0.196) (0.229)
Model 0.095 0.157 0.204 0.236 0.254
(0.014) (0.021) (0.027) (0.038) (0.055)
Standard Deviations
Data 0.748 1.547 2.194 2.783 3.297
(0.128) (0.219) (0.257) (0.288) (0.332)
Model 0.612 1.434 2.213 2.936 3.609
(0.034) (0.079) (0.122) (0.160) (0.198)
PANEL B: PREDICTABILITY REGRESSIONS
Data Estimates Model-ImpliedEstimates
gπ y (20) R2 gπ y (20) R2
n =4 -0.151 -0.284 0.338 0.060 -0.176 -0.272 0.304 0.093
(0.108) (0.145) (0.117) (0.107) (0.099) (0.083)
n =1 2 -0.520 -1.125 1.077 0.077 -0.531 -1.155 1.131 0.096
(0.320) (0.430) (0.359) (0.385) (0.361) (0.305)
n =2 0 -0.683 -1.853 1.662 0.082 -0.844 -1.943 1.811 0.096
(0.485) (0.650) (0.536) (0.631) (0.597) (0.503)
PANEL C: FACTOR COEFFICIENTS
Maturity (qtrs)
4 8 12 16 20
Ax
n 0.004 0.009 0.012 0.015 0.018
Bx
n g -0.103 -0.262 -0.444 -0.618 -0.777
π -0.313 -0.733 -1.090 -1.411 -1.706
fu 0.357 0.791 1.125 1.410 1.669
40Note: Panel A lists moments of one-quarter approximate excess holding period returns, arx
(n)
t+1,i nt h e
data and implied by the model (see equation (25)). For the model, we construct the posterior distribution
of unconditional moments by computing the unconditional moments implied from the parameters in each
iteration of the Gibbs sampler. Panel B regresses one-quarter approximate excess holding period returns for
an n-period bond, arx
(n)
t+1 onto the output gap, inﬂation, and the 20-quarter bond yield. The standard errors
for the OLS estimates from data (in parentheses) are computed usingrobust standard errors. We compute the
model-implied coefﬁcients and R2 as follows. We construct the posterior distributionsof the model-implied
estimates by computing the implied coefﬁcients from the model parameters in each iteration of the Gibbs
sampler. We report posterior means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of each coefﬁcient. Panel C
reports the coefﬁcients, summing the values over all lags of each factor, of the conditional expected excess
holdingperiod return deﬁned in equation (10) on the factors. The data frequency is quarterly and the sample
period is June 1952 to December 2004.
41Table 6: TAYLOR RULES
PANEL A: BENCHMARK TAYLOR RULE
Full Sample Pre-82:Q4 Post-83:Q1
OLS Model OLS Model OLS Model
const 0.005 0.011 0.003 0.011 0.002 0.010
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
gt 0.338 0.509 0.283 0.503 0.548 0.457
(0.095) (0.044) (0.282) (0.103) (0.182) (0.103)
πt 0.900 0.238 0.979 0.229 1.825 0.572
(0.135) (0.079) (0.417) (0.079) (0.165) (0.167)
PANEL B: BACKWARD-LOOKING TAYLOR RULE
const gt πt gt−1 πt−1 rt−1 R2
Full Sample OLS 0.000 0.380 0.322 -0.268 -0.181 0.866 0.897
(0.000) (0.107) (0.248) (0.117) (0.237) (0.043)
Model 0.000 0.509 0.238 -0.372 -0.124 0.911 0.950
(0.000) (0.044) (0.079) (0.049) (0.083) (0.024)
Pre-82:Q4 OLS 0.001 0.345 0.241 -0.183 -0.011 0.774 0.881
Model 0.000 0.503 0.229 -0.323 -0.068 0.870 0.938
Post-83:Q1 OLS 0.000 0.516 0.791 -0.461 -0.761 0.960 0.956




k =1 0.011 0.590 0.292
(0.001) (0.030) (0.016)
k =4 0.010 0.741 0.365
(0.001) (0.039) (0.016)
k =8 0.009 0.975 0.486
(0.001) (0.078) (0.016)





const ˆ gt ˆ πt β
k = ∞ 0.010 0.168 0.054 0.857
(0.001) (0.008) (0.002) (0.007)
PANEL E: FORWARD- AND BACKWARD-LOOKING TAYLOR RULE
const Et(gt+k,k)E t(πt+k,k) Lags of g Lags of πr t−1 R2
k =1 0.000 0.590 0.292 -0.672 -0.785 0.908 0.951
(0.000) (0.030) (0.016) (0.037) (0.028) (0.001)
k =4 -0.001 0.741 0.365 -0.867 -1.318 0.911 0.950
(0.000) (0.039) (0.016) (0.047) (0.053) (0.001)
Note: Panel A reports the OLS and model-impliedestimates of the benchmark Taylor (1993)rule in equation
(11)over thefullsample and over subperiods;Panel Breportsthe backward-lookingTaylorrule (12);Panel C
reports the ﬁnite-horizon, forward-lookingTaylor rule without discounting in equation (20); Panel D reports
the inﬁnite-horizon, forward-looking Taylor rule with discounting in equation (21); and Panel E reports
estimates of the forward- and backward-looking Taylor rule in Section 2.7. In Panel E, we report the sums
of the coefﬁcients of the output gap and inﬂation over all four lags. For the forward-lookingTaylor rules in
Panels C-E, we holdthe estimates of the VAR parameters inequation(2) and re-estimate the forward-looking
Taylor rule coefﬁcients together with the prices of risk. For the model-implied coefﬁcients, we construct
the posterior distribution of Taylor rule coefﬁcients by computing the implied coefﬁcients from the model
parameters in each iteration of the Gibbs sampler. We report posterior means and standard deviations (in
parentheses) of each coefﬁcient. The standard errors for the OLS estimates (in parentheses) are computed
using robust standard errors. In each panel, the data frequency is quarterly and the full sample period is from
June 1952 to December 2004.
43Figure 1: OUTPUT GAP,I NFLATION, AND SHORT RATE














We plotthe outputgap, year-on-year inﬂation measured by the GDP deﬂator and the 1-quarter maturity short
rate.
44Figure 2: IMPULSE RESPONSE FUNCTIONS






























































The panels show responses of the output gap, inﬂation, and the short rate to 1% shocks to the output gap
g,i n ﬂation π, and the short rate r. The left column shows responses implied by the model, while the right
column presents response functions computed from an unrestricted VAR(4) of (gt πt rt) . We compute the
1% r shock from the model by scaling an f shock so that the short rate changes by 1%. We show quarters
on the x-axis. The impulse responses are computed using a Choleskydecompositionthat orders the variables
(g, π, f) for the model and (g, π, r) for the unrestricted VAR.
45Figure 3: LATENT FACTOR,S HORT RATE, AND THE OLS BENCHMARK TAYLOR RULE













OLS Basic Taylor Rule Residual
We plot the posterior mean of the latent factor fu
t , the demeaned short rate from data, and the residuals from
the OLS estimate of the basic Taylor Rule, which is computed by running OLS on equation (11). The latent
factor, short rate, and OLS residuals are all annualized.
46Figure 4: EXPECTED EXCESS BOND RETURNS







(Exact) Expected Excess Return
4 Quarter Yield
20 Quarter Yield
We plot the conditional expected excess holding period return Et[rx
(n)
t+1] of a 4-quarter and 20-quarter bond
impliedby the posteriormean of the latent factors throughtime. The numbers on the y-axis are in percentage
terms per annum.
47Figure 5: SERIALLY CORRELATED MONETARY POLICY SHOCKS













OLS Basic Taylor Rule Residual











In the top panel, we plot the residuals from the OLS estimate of the basic Taylor Rule, which is computed
by runningOLS on equation (11) and the posterior mean estimates of monetary policy shocks from a Taylor
rule with serially correlated shocks (ε
MP,AR
t in equation (16)). The bottom panel plots the short rate data
and rAR, which is the ﬁtted short rate using equation (16),rAR
t = ct +Ψ t(L)fo
t . In both the top and bottom
panels, we plot annualized numbers.
48Figure 6: BACKWARD-LOOKING MONETARY POLICY SHOCKS












In the top panel, we plot the OLS estimates of the residuals of the backwards-looking Taylor rule (12). The




t from equation (14). In both the top and bottom panels, we plot annualized
monetary policy shocks. NBER recessions are shown as shaded bars.
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